



Chapter 8: Memory Unravelling: The 50th Anniversary of the 1956 




2006 promised to be a big year in Hungarian-U.S. relations. Just three years before, the 
Republic of Hungary had joined the United States as one of the countries of “New Europe” in 
its invasion of Iraq, opening a new chapter in the two nations’ geopolitical relationship. Now 
Hungary was celebrating the 50th anniversary of its 1956 uprising against its own Communist 
government, which, not in the least because of its tragic ending in Soviet armed suppression, at 
the time was widely interpreted in the West as a whole people’s desperate stand for freedom. 
Now both the United States and the Hungarian governments were planning a series of 
anniversary events involving representation at the highest level, where they would elegantly 
derive from the heroic past messages for the challenges of the present and guideposts for a 
shared future. Diplomats in both countries were expecting unproblematic, well-executed events 
of dignified remembrance, polite commendations of the veterans of that conflict, and emotional 
reminiscing by Americans about their sympathy for the teenage Budapest streetfighters and the 
thousands of Hungarian exiles who the United States took in after the crushing of the revolution.  
Yet the official commemorations in Budapest proved to be anything but unproblematic. 
On October 23, 2006, 50 years to the day when Hungarian civilians battled their own security 
services and Russian troops on the streets of Budapest, the United States Embassy in the city 
watched with bated breath as Hungarian extremists, crowds in opposition to the Hungarian 
government, and even the veterans of the original 1956 events themselves, battled Hungarian 
riot police with everything they could get their hands on – including an original and still 
functioning 1956 tank.  
Deploying approaches from Memory Studies and Performance Studies, this chapter will 
be an analytical history of how the memory of 1956 unraveled in Hungarian-U.S. relations in 
the fall of 2006. In government documents, personal interviews and their attendant media 
coverage, I will trace the anatomy of failure by both national governments to anticipate the 
explosion of commemorative protests by right-of-center and far-right political forces within 
Hungary, which arguably undid both countries’ commemorative diplomacy during the 
anniversary. This case study of the 2006 commemorations of the 1956 Hungarian uprising 
demonstrates that even the most carefully crafted official remembrance of the past is vulnerable 
to challenges to its memory régime by non-state actors – and national governments and their 
diplomats must plan for such contingencies. 
 
Definitions: Commemorations as Performances of Cultural Memory 
 
Of the many, nuanced but contentious definitions of collective memory, my use of the 
term public memory is closest to Jan Assmann’s concept of cultural memory, which denotes the 
ways of institutionalized remembering of (most usually) the national past. Assmann defined 
cultural memory as “that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in 
each epoch, whose ‘cultivation’ serves to stabilize and convey that society’s self-image. Upon 
such collective knowledge… each group bases its awareness of unity and particularity.”1 As 
Wulf Kansteiner subsequently elucidated, “Cultural memory consists of objectified culture - 
that is, the texts, rites, images, buildings and monuments which are designed to recall fateful 
                                                 





events in the history of the collective. As the officially sanctioned heritage of a society, they 
are intended for the longue durée.”2  
It is especially fruitful to apply to cultural memory the interpretive framework of 
Performance Studies as defined by Diana Taylor in her 2003 book The Archive and the 
Repertoire. Here, the author theorizes the relationship between forms of knowledge fixed in 
objects, and embodied practices. Taylor defines the archive as containing “documents, maps, 
literary texts, letters, archeological remains, bones, videos, films, CDs, all those items 
supposedly resistant to change.” On the other hand, the repertoire “enacts embodied memory: 
performances, gestures, orality, movement, dance, singing – in short, all those acts usually 
thought of as ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge.”3 Taylor is careful to point out that while 
the archive is often privileged over the repertoire, these two forms of knowledge work in 
complementary ways, and materials from the archive can shape performance practices.4   
This chapter interprets official national commemorations as codified performances in 
the repertoire of the dominant memory régime of a nation state, which utilize the archive of 
cultural memory. Such commemorations have been adapted by national governments for 
purposes of international diplomacy. However, at what John Bodnar called the “vernacular” 
level of memory,5 non-state actors also utilize such commemorative events to advance their 
own agendas by performing challenges and alternatives to the officially sanctioned national 
narrative. The 50th anniversary of the 1956 Uprising in U.S.-Hungarian relations is a story of 
the contestation of the official commemorative performances, as well as of the very memory of 
the original event, by non-state actors, disseminated by international media. 
 
The Memory Régimes of 1956 in the Cold War and After 
 
The original events of October and November 1956 unfolded as an uprising-turned 
popular revolution by Hungarian students and workers, which, through its alliance with so-
called “reform Communist” politicians in power and the Hungarian army, and under withering 
fire from the Hungarian Communist state security (secret police), was radicalized in its goals 
and eventually aimed for full independence for Hungary from the Soviet orbit. During the brief 
interim period when the revolutionaries were consolidating their gains, old-guard Communist 
                                                 
2 Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: a Methodological Critique of Collective Memory 
Studies’, In History and Theory, xli (2002), 182. 
3 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 19, 20. 
4 Ibid., 21.  
5 In his scholarship of U.S. public memory, John Bodnar distinguished two co-existing, often competing 
forms of culture: “vernacular” and “official.” He identified vernacular memory as sub-national, belonging to 
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politician János Kádár visited the Soviet Union and requested Russian help in putting down the 
uprising. Soviet troops soon moved back into Hungary, crushing the mostly civilian resistance, 
sparking the emigration of over one hundred thousand Hungarians, and paving the way for the 
bloody political retribution that followed.  
From 1957 until the end of Socialism in 1989, the events of 1956 were presented in 
Hungary as a “counterrevolution” orchestrated by “Western agents” in collaboration with 
(presumably former Nazi) Hungarian militants and common criminals. The official version 
aired in the media and represented in documentaries and school textbooks blamed agent 
provocateurs for firing at law enforcement from within the crowds in order to turn 
demonstrations into bloodbaths and protestors into armed militants. It dwelt on images of 
prisons forced open and common criminals let loose on the streets, then being armed by the 
enemies of the “people’s democracy”. It emphasized the gruesome horrors of the “lynchings” 
by bloodthirsty rioters of decent civil servants and officers who had tried to enforce the law. 
Above all, the dominant Socialist memory régime depicted the post-1956 supreme Communist 
leader, János Kádár, as the man who saved his country by requesting Russian help and assuming 
leadership.6 
The turning point in national memory came in 1989, when the reformist section of the 
country’s Socialist leadership embarked on negotiations with its democratic opposition about a 
peaceful transition to free-market democracy. One of the most tangible milestones of this 
transition was the re-burial of reformist politician Imre Nagy, the “reform Communist” prime 
minister during the 1956 events, subsequent victim of a Soviet show trial. As Maya Nadkarni 
observed, during the 1989 negotiations for democracy, “the main forces of the [political] 
opposition wanted to evoke the spirit of 1956 without actually conjuring it up as a model for 
action.”7 István Rév went as far as asserting that the common ground in the negotiations 
between the Socialist régime and its semi-underground democratic opposition was that both 
sides wanted to avoid a repeat of 1956 in 1989.8 In this interpretation, the Hungarian opposition 
were using the memory of the events of 1956 as leverage for a peaceful transition to democracy.  
With the first democratic elections in 1990, the revision of public memory also began. 
Now 1956 came to be regarded as a “popular uprising,” a “revolution” which began when 
students in Budapest demonstrated for reforms on October 23 of that year. Previously 
downplayed by the Socialist régime, the new version emphasized the convergence of workers 
with students to form the wide social base of the revolution. The conflict was presented as the 
result of years of terror by the secret police and totalitarian rule backed by Soviet advisors, and 
as a genuine struggle for freedom and democracy. The 1956 slogan “Ruszkik haza!” (“Russians 
Go Home”) was evoked to portray the demonstrations as a movement to rid the nation of its 
foreign oppressors. The street rallies were presented as peaceful until the secret police started 
to fire into the crowd from the rooftops, when they turned into battles to protect the homeland 
from ruthless Communist henchmen. The summary executions of supposed law enforcement 
and secret police by revolutionaries were rarely discussed at length – they were rather seen as 
acts of wrath or righteous vengeance for either recent atrocities or the preceding years of terror.  
     In this new version of the past, Communist reformist leader Imre Nagy was portrayed 
as an official who realized the merits and legitimacy of the revolution, and assisted it by forming 
a new government – and as a martyr who was later executed by the Soviets. Presented as the 
                                                 
6 Personal recollection of the language of elementary and high school history textbooks from the 
1980s and early 1990s. Kádár was the topmost leader of Hungary between 1956 and 1988. 
7 Maya Nadkarni, “The Death of Socialism and the Afterlife of Its Monuments: Making and Marketing 
the Past in Budapest’s Statue Park Museum.” In Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, eds., Contested 
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real heroes of the revolution were the youth of Budapest – teenagers who took on the Soviet 
tanks with home-made ‘Molotov cocktails’ (firebombs), tommy guns, and ingenuity in the side 
streets of the city, and fought until further resistance was hopeless - and were tried and executed 
sometimes only years later. Veteran organizations of the 1956 freedom fighters also contributed 
to this discourse: their phrase “the lads of Pest” came to evoke images of streetwise young 
revolutionaries on the barricades.9 Their struggle was presented as a lost cause that was first 
encouraged by Western propaganda, and then abandoned by the West. In the post-Communist 
era, the foremost visual sign of the 1956 revolution was the Hungarian tri-color flag with a hole 
in the middle, where the coat of arms of the Communist system used to be. 
 
A Policy for Hungarian Commemorative Diplomacy 
My initial question in this book’s investigation was whether the United States and 
Central European governments have had any coherent policy for using memory in their 
diplomacy across the Atlantic since the end of the Cold War. The fact that the Hungarian 
government has not had such a policy may be explained by several factors. As a mid-level 
Hungarian career diplomat who served in the United States during the 50th anniversary 
commemorations of the 1956 events explained, the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs does 
not have a policy for using commemorations in its foreign relations – rather, it allows its 
embassies to “create [and] execute diplomacy on their own.”10 On the one hand, such a ‘policy 
of no policy’ allows for the kind of flexibility in diplomatic relations that is needed to build and 
maintain good relations with the host country’s government. It also harnesses the expertise of 
the diplomatic post’s staff, and allows them to apply their training11 and experience to embassy 
projects tailored to the host country. However, this freedom to conduct diplomacy has some 
limits: commemorative programming is usually not included in the foreign ministry’s budget, 
so embassies have to make a case for such events and request funding for them from Budapest, 
in addition to securing other sponsorship.  
Seen in this way, the lack of a central policy for memory diplomacy may actually 
advance the effectiveness of commemorative programming. Hungary’s embassies like the one 
in Washington, D.C. usually have a calendar of anniversaries for the year, from which they are 
free to select events to commemorate in their public diplomacy programming. Yet not all 
historical events are regarded as equally suitable for remembering. One source identified a few 
historical events that he claimed were simply too controversial to create programming for – 
such as the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, which dismantled the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
assigning most of Hungary’s former territories to neighboring countries, and making millions 
of Magyars ethnic minorities in those nations. Commemorating Trianon would evoke 
conflicting memories by “several neighboring countries, and we wouldn’t want to be an 
elephant in the porcelain store.” Likewise, the Hungarian embassy would be reluctant to 
commemorate an event that implicated the US government in injustice or crimes, like those 
related to the removal of Native Americans to reservations.12 In one diplomat’s own words, “I 
think what you need to do – and this is the classical role of diplomacy – is to highlight positive 
elements of the past” of bilateral relations. 
                                                 
9 Also see the exhibition “The Lads of Pest” of the House of Terror Museum. Online: 
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11 Several staff working at the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, D.C. and at the United States 
Embassy in Budapest hold university degrees in American Studies, an interdisciplinary field that includes 
training in US history, government, culture and society. Personal knowledge and experience.  




A lack of dictates from the center can also make for a self-aware and thoughtful use of 
memory in diplomacy. One source in the Hungarian diplomatic community denied that the 
country’s foreign ministry would have dictated any kind of narrative about historical events. 
He acknowledged that (especially in recent years)13 there have been serious debates about 
historical revisionism and memory in Hungary, but claimed that these usually take place within 
the domestic sphere and government, and do not spill over into foreign policy.14 His faith in the 
immunity of diplomatic posts to the intensifying domestic conflicts over national memory 
makes for a confidence in the embassy’s commemorative projects, and in the kind of narratives 
he and his team communicated in their programming that commemorated the 50th anniversary 
of the 1956 uprising in 2006. Yet such an attitude, which relegates the politics of memory to 
the domestic sphere, is also vulnerable to being blind-sided when non-state actors inject their 
challenges to the country’s official memory régime in the international realm.  
 
Hungarian Commemorative Diplomacy in 2006 
In 2006, the 50th anniversary year of the 1956 uprising, the real driving force behind 
U.S.-Hungarian commemorative diplomacy was the small team at the Hungarian embassy in 
Washington, D.C.15 Here, at least one key official shaping the events had not only experience 
in the Hungarian diplomatic corps, but he had also had extensive training in American Studies, 
an inter-disciplinary field of area studies which emphasizes historical scholarship and cultural 
analysis of the United States. In this sense, the success of the 2006 Hungarian commemorative 
diplomacy is to some extent an indication of the uses of this field of knowledge, with its reigning 
paradigms, guiding concerns and methodologies. Yet the same official had also been exposed 
to the commemorative programming of the 150th anniversary of the visit of Hungarian 
revolutionary Lajos Kossuth to the United States, held in 2001-02 by the previous cohort of 
embassy workers and makers of foreign policy. Thus, the repertoire of Hungarian memory 
diplomacy relied on the archive of both area studies training and the records of earlier 
commemorative performances.  
The Hungarian Embassy’s commemorative programming was part of its larger shift in 
focus and tools from a more traditional statecraft to what Zoltán Fehér has termed “creative 
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role in commemorative programming in 2006. Self-justification and –aggrandizement is a pitfall of elite 
interviewing, and information from such sources must not be taken at face value. Therefore, while my 
knowledge of some sources assures me of no such bias, this data will only be taken as indicative, not definitive. 
For more on elite interviewing as a method, see Michael C. Hall, “Elite Interviews: Critical Practice and 
Tourism.” Current Issues in Tourism, Oct 2014, Vol. 17 Issue 9, 832-848; Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, 
“Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews.” PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 2002), 673-676; 
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diplomacy.”16 Appointed in 2007 the Embassy’s “chief creative officer”, Fehér explained that 
in contrast with the previous practice of cultivating good relations with the U.S. elites and the 
Hungarian American community, the Embassy during this period was developing an approach 
to a wider target audience, featuring some new tools. In contrast with the earlier (1998-2002) 
Orbán administration’s efforts to target the U.S. Hungarian diaspora and use their lobbying 
power in the U.S. government, the two Gyurcsány cabinets’ (2004-2009) transatlantic 
diplomacy was pitched directly to the host country’s elites – as well as to the wider U.S. public. 
In addition to the American government, scholarly and media elite, who were by nature older, 
the new target audience were Americans in their twenties and thirties – a niche usually not very 
interested in, or understanding of, diplomacy, thus quite difficult to reach. Tailoring its tools to 
these target audiences, the Embassy aimed to use the personal memory of the older generations, 
and some forms of popular culture consumed by the younger demographic.17  
Using their freedom to create diplomatic programming, the Hungarian embassy in 
Washington, D.C. planned an impressive series of commemorative events in 2006. Their 
programming involved the launch of historian Charles Gati’s book Failed Illusions: Moscow, 
Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt; an exhibition of 1956 photography in 
the Katzen Arts Center of American University; a conference at the Cold War Museum titled 
“Cold War Conversations: the Uprisings and Revolutions of 1956”; the premiere and a special 
themed evening of Béla Bartók’s “Blue Beard’s Castle” at the Washington National Opera; a 
series of classical music concerts by Hungarian performers; screenings of the feature film 
Children of Glory by Hollywood Hungarian American producer Andy Vajna and the 
documentary Freedom’s Fury co-produced by Vajna, Quentin Tarantino and Lucy Liu; and a 
national reception at the Organization of the American States.18  
The Embassy’s programming itself revealed a microcosm of the major players of the 
politics of memory in the transatlantic realm. The post planned high (classical) culture 
performances and glitzy receptions to cultivate the U.S. government elite; they put on a history 
book launch and a conference for the scholarly community and the general reading public; they 
promoted a photo exhibition and two Hollywood-style films about 1956 to attract younger 
mainstream audiences and please popular cultural producers; and they invited and featured 
prominent members of the Hungarian American community, as well as Magyar veterans of the 
original events, at the more high-level and quality events.  
Both its timing and its conceptual instinct allowed the Embassy to play what I call “heart 
strings diplomacy.” Beyond the fact that the drama and characters of 1956 lend themselves 
easily to storytelling – it was, according to the consensus, a ‘young people’s revolution’ – the 
planners of the commemorative diplomacy of 2006 consciously exploited the age of their target 
audience. As Fehér explained it, the Embassy calculated that the U.S. elites would be old 
enough to have had personal memories of 1956 from the U.S. media.19 President George W. 
Bush with his 60 years was on the younger side of this demographic; many other senior policy 
                                                 
16 Zoltán Fehér, “From Back Channels to The Colbert Report: The Changing Face of Transatlantic 
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17 One definite achievement on the part of the Embassy with this younger crowd was Fehér’s 
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18 “A washingtoni magyar nagykövetség rendezvényei az 1956-os forradalom 50. évfordulójára. 2006. 
ősz.” [Events for the 50th Anniversary of the 1956 Revolution – by the Embassy of Hungary, Washington, D.C.] 
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and opinion makers were in their mid-to late sixties and seventies. Hence, the personal 
memories of the formative years of these people would have included the story of the 1956 
uprising, its tragic end, questions about the role and response of the United States to these 
events, and their associated strong emotions.20 The memory of 1956 – as mediated by 
contemporary U.S. news coverage – had been seared into the hearts and minds of this generation 
as children. Hence, for them remembering 1956 would have served not only as a “flashbulb 
memory,” but also as a recollection of their own childhood. Originally developed by Roger 
Brown and James Kulick in the 1970s, according to Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “flashbulb 
memories” are  recollections of especially momentous (“historic”) and dramatic events, as vivid 
and clear as flash photography, comprising records of the circumstances (the when, where and 
how) of the subject’s learning of the original event. 21 It is beyond the scope of this study to 
investigate the changes in personal memory over time; however, it is fair to expect that such 
“flashbulb memories” will be overlaid with the subsequently produced images, texts and sounds 
of cultural memory. It was the layers of these types of memory that the Hungarian Embassy 
utilized in its commemorative diplomacy with the U.S. elite.22 
Yet it was not only the Embassy’s “heart strings diplomacy” that sealed the deal with 
the Americans. The drive in Hungarian diplomacy to perform cultural memory in a transatlantic 
context also came from more mundane factors. For one, the Embassy’s leadership knew that 
the April 2006 Hungarian Parliamentary elections may result in their being replaced with 
another cohort of officials. Their urge to plan the events months in advance also came from a 
sense of historic opportunity to accomplish an American presidential visit to Hungary, which 
they regarded as a supreme achievement in transatlantic relations. Paradoxically, planning the 
commemorative events half a year ahead set the Embassy on a course which was easier to stay 
even as the commemorations in their home country exploded, threatening to unravel their 
transatlantic memory diplomacy.   
 
Hollywood Enters the Fray: Popular Culture and the Transatlantic Memory of 1956 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, an especially powerful producer of cultural memory is the 
popular culture industry. This also holds true in the transatlantic realm, where, due to its 
dominance and the popular demand for its products, Hollywood shapes how its publics think 
about the past on both sides of the ocean. For their commemorations of the 50th anniversary of 
the 1956 uprising in U.S.-Hungarian relations, the Hungarian government had an ally in 
diasporic and immigrant Hungarian film makers. These entertainers and cinematic artists - first 
and foremost among them Andrew Vajna - acted independently of national governments, but 
their style of popular remembrance aligned well with the Hungarian government’s “heart 
strings” memory diplomacy, even as it conformed to U.S. conventions of film making.  
As the anniversary year, 2006 saw the release of two major filmic portrayals of the 1956 
uprising. Directed by Colin Gray and Megan Raney and executive produced by Lucy Liu, 
Quentin Tarantino and Andrew Vajna, Freedom’s Fury23 was a documentary about the 1956 
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Melbourne Olympics water polo semi-final match between Hungary and the Soviet Union, 
which turned into a public political contest to avenge the crushing of the Magyar uprising just 
weeks before. Directed by Krisztina Goda and produced by Andrew Vajna, Children of Glory24 
was a full-length feature film that wove together the story of the same match with a romantic 
thread, making for a story of two lovers, student leader Viki and water polo player Karcsi, who 
fall in love during the revolution, but have to part ways to fight for their country half the world 
away from each other.  
As their star-studded lists of producers show, both films were created for popular 
audiences, and accordingly, over time they were distributed world-wide and in 6 countries, 
respectively. Their promotion was robust and also received attention from the two national 
governments. While Children of Glory only premiered on October 23, 2006, the day of the 50th 
anniversary of the uprising, it had already been previewed on October 7 in the Guardian, and 
also had a presidential screening at the White House just five days after its release25. Freedom’s 
Fury was officially released on September 7, 2006 in Hungary, but the documentary had already 
premiered in Budapest on December 6, 2005, had been previewed by Hungary’s 1956 Institute 
on February 7, 2006, shown and reviewed at the Tribeca Film Festival in New York in late 
April of that year, and previewed on Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty on May 526. Thus, both 
national governments clearly deployed these films to support their memory diplomacy.  
The popular reception of the films was good overall, but neither became a runaway hit 
outside of Hungary. Despite opening only in October, Children of Glory became the top 
Hungarian film of 2006, attracting some 451,000 viewers.27 General audiences panned the 
movie for its forced romantic thread, but they liked it for its strong acting, its ability to generate 
emotions in the viewer, its spectacles, and its integration of politics and sports in its storyline.28 
Viewers appreciated the historical authenticity of Freedom’s Fury, as well as its dimension of 
sports history, its unhurried pacing, attention and space to the original participants – but some 
complained about its lack of historical context.29  
The films’ critical reception was mixed. Freedom’s Fury received a glowing review 
from Hungary’s Institute for the History of 195630 – which the documentary credited for 
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29 User reviews of Freedom’s Fury, June 2006 – August 2008. International Movie Database. 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0322332/reviews?ref_=tt_ql_3 . Accessed December 25, 2016. 
30 “Freedom's Fury Review.” Culture Section, 1956 Institute, Hungary. February 7, 2006. Online. 




support,31 likely historical consultation32 – and some film connoisseurs praised its use of 
archival footage and interviews with the participants of the original events.33 Yet some critics 
panned the documentary for factual inaccuracies, its length and the over-seriousness of its 
treatment of its topic; and implied that the film was missing its audience, because it was a 
historical documentary and not a sports piece.34 Children of Glory was criticized both by 
Hungarian historians and some former players of the 1956 Olympic water polo team for its 
Hollywood conventions and its romantic portrayal of the uprising.35 Other reviewers faulted the 
film for wanting to do too much, and claimed it lost its identity and audience between action 
movie, romantic drama, and sports flick. However, its spectacular depiction of civilians fighting 
the Soviet army on the streets of Budapest overwhelmed even the critical film connoisseur: as 
Tibor Fischer reviewing the movie for The Guardian confessed, “I have to admit I choked up.”36 
In their promotion, both films were linked to the personal story of their producer, 
Andrew Vajna. The films’ public relations materials and interviews usually related how Vajna 
was sent to the West as a 12-year old by his parents as a result of the fateful events of 1956, and 
how this tragic journey propelled him into a career in the US film industry. Vajna went on to 
work on the production of a number of classic popular action movie franchises, including 
Rambo, Die Hard, and the Terminator films. He began thinking about producing a movie about 
1956 back in the 1990s, but it took him and fellow Hungarian-American screenwriter Joe 
Eszterhas until they saw Miracle, a 2004 docudrama about the U.S.-USSR ice hockey struggle 
at the 1980 Winter Olympics, to hatch the idea of weaving a sports match into the drama of the 
Hungarian Revolution.37 Thus, the creation story of Children of Glory was rooted in the original 
historical event of its topic through the very person of its producer. Driven by 1956, the life 
story of Vajna now came full circle with his grateful tribute to the heroes of the uprising on the 
streets and at an historic sports event – in a seamlessly woven Hollywood tapestry. The 
masterful personalization of this product by the American popular culture industry was thus 
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combined with a sense of personal involvement in history (or a longing for it) by the film’s 
makers, actors, and audience. Ideally, different age groups would be able to see themselves in 
the films’ characters: while the over-60s would see their youth in the actors and veterans, the 
18-40 age demographic could directly identify with the ‘freedom fighters’ and the athletes of 
the original events.  
As a film, Freedom’s Fury told the story of a sports event that, because of its 
contemporary geopolitical context, became a political performance. Uncharacteristic of a sports 
documentary, the film did not assign much decisive agency to its protagonists. For one, it made 
clear that both teams were representing their countries, which had been locked into a struggle 
over Hungary’s self-determination. Describing the fateful match, players from both sides 
characterized the Soviet team as “victims of circumstance.” While both teams seem to have 
shared the Soviets’ desire to play just to win – and not for political purposes – the geopolitics 
of the event overwhelmed them once they felt the audience’s response. Thus, the Hungarian 
players are said to have been driven into a frenzy by their supporters, and the Soviet athletes 
matched their roughness in the heat of the game. Former members of both teams claimed that 
it was the media that sensationalized the event as the “Blood in the Water” match, and that in 
actuality they did not play out of hate. Yet two Hungarian players also interpreted the event as 
symbolic vengeance by their side against the Soviet Union for its recent crushing of Hungary’s 
attempt at independence. As one put it, since they felt powerless militarily, the Hungarian team 
“turned the [sports] match into a battlefield.”38 
If the viewers expected to see the surviving athletes’ scars at their reunion arranged by 
the film makers 46 years later, they would have been disappointed. They were treated to a strong 
dose of reconciliation instead. While one Hungarian former player expressed some trepidation, 
the careful editing showed the surviving team members from both sides embracing in 
friendship, and only exhibiting their wayward boyishness in tender ways. Thus, at the end of 
their second and last meeting, “they say goodbye to each other – but will take with them the 
memory of an historic match resolved into peace.”39 Perhaps the Hungarian players could afford 
to be gracious not only because they were reliving their youth, but simply because they had won 
all those years ago, and thereby had achieved some personal and group catharsis. Their 2002 
reconciliation also carried no price: Hungary had already become a free and democratic country 
13 years before, therefore they were also victorious through history.  
 
The documentary’s reconciliationist message was only amplified by its preview on 
Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty in May 2006: 
 
An Opportunity For Reconciliation  
 
But the film […] is also a tribute to the ability of men who once met as bitter foes to forgive 
with the passage of time and to come to terms with history. 
 
Gray says that when the filmmakers were finally able to get together the 13 surviving players 
in 2002, the reunion was a profound emotional moment. […] 
 
“Both teams were as much a victim of the circumstances and really both countries were 
imprisoned by the same ideology -- and these guys were able to finally reconnect as human 
beings and as fellow athletes,” says Gray. “That was something that we really wanted to 
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highlight, the sort of humanistic side to counter the sort of oppression of ideology that everyone 
had suffered under in the Eastern bloc.”40  
 
Thus, whether it was constructed by the film makers or articulated by the original 
players, the U.S. popular culture industry’s dominant trope of ‘band of brothers’ was projected 
on Hungary in 1956 and the Hungarian-Soviet match in Melbourne. The fact that Radio Free 
Europe, the long-time cultural diplomacy arm of the United States government, chose to 
emphasize this aspect of the documentary proves as much the government’s use of this product 
of popular culture in its memory diplomacy, as Radio Free Europe’s effort to retroactively 
exonerate itself from the charges levelled against it of encouraging the armed uprising and 
resistance in Hungary in 1956.41  
Indeed, it is this victory in the log arc of history that was emphasized by the film makers 
as the moral of the documentary. The film’s last montage traced the ‘spirit’ of 1956 through a 
series of events loosely defined as freedom struggles, from the U.S. Civil Rights Movement of 
the 1960s, through Tiananmen Square in 1989, the “end of Apartheid” in South Africa in 1994, 
to Serbia’s “ouster of dictator” Slobodan Milosevic in 2000.42 In this expression of cultural 
memory, the original water polo match of Freedom’s Fury was transformed into a symbolic 
revision of 1956 as a victory for the Hungarians in their long (and otherwise universalized) 
search for freedom. In a rather forced move, the film makers even attempted to link this 
mythical historical force to the Olympics, attributing to the Games some kind of liberatory 
power. As in the film’s final image an athlete kindles the Olympic flame in the arena, the 
voiceover proclaims, “One thing is for certain: the struggle for freedom continues to this day, 
bringing the light of hope to this world.”43 
 
U.S. Commemorative Diplomacy in 2006 
The fact that the Bush administration prioritized the commemorations of 1956 in 2006 
has several explanations. While the Hungarian diaspora in the United States had lost the 
political significance it held during the Cold War as a community of exiles from the Eastern 
Bloc with a special anti-Communist propaganda value, certain members of it still held high 
office and political power, such as Congressman Tom Lantos, founder of the Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus and the only Holocaust survivor to serve in the U.S. Congress (another 
episode of international memory politics), who just the following year would go on to chair the 
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs.44 One other reason for the attention by the 
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U.S. government to commemorating 1956 was that the events provided a stage for the symbolic 
shoring up of the current geopolitical alliance between the United States and “New Europe” 
(such as Hungary and Poland) in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This latter function of 
American commemorative diplomacy emerges from a close reading of U.S. anniversary 
programming in 2006.  
In its memory diplomacy, the U.S. government used some of its tried and true tools. On 
October 18, 2006, the Office of the Press Secretary issued a presidential proclamation titled 
“50th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution,” in which he declared October 23 of that year 
the day for Americans to commemorate the uprising.45 Even in its brevity, the proclamation 
managed to position 1956 in the history of the progress of liberty against tyranny – a hallmark 
of the idealist strand in US foreign policy. 
 
The story of Hungarian democracy represents the triumph of liberty over tyranny. In the fall of 
1956, the Hungarian people demanded change, and tens of thousands of students, workers, and 
other citizens bravely marched through the streets to call for freedom. […] The lesson of the 
Hungarian experience is clear: liberty can be delayed, but it cannot be denied. […] 
 
The United States is grateful for the warm relationship between our countries and for Hungary's 
efforts to expand freedom and democracy around the world in places such as the Balkans, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Cuba. By spreading the blessings of liberty, Hungary is helping to lay the 
foundation of peace for generations to come.”46 
 
For Bush, the guidance of Hungary’s failed revolutionary project for the present was 
that freedom would triumph over tyranny – a trans=historical (if not ahistorical) application of 
a Cold War event to the battlefields of the Global War on Terror. Accordingly, a celebration of 
the events of 1956 also served to “recognize the friendship between the United States and 
Hungary; and [to] reaffirm our shared desire to spread freedom to people around the world,”47 
most recently evident in the Hungarian contribution of a contingent of troops in Afghanistan 
(2003-2013), the country’s 300 soldiers in the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, and the 77 
Hungarian T-72 tanks donated to the new Iraqi military just the previous year.48 
The rhetorical parallel between the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the U.S.-Hungarian 
alliance in the War on Terror may have been the creation of a clever White House speech writer 
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– or of a non-state actor. On March 20, 2006, President Bush had given a speech at the City 
Club of Cleveland on the War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the Q&A that 
followed, a man representing the “Cleveland Hungarian Revolution 50th Anniversary” 
commission had an exchange with the president, in which the questioner drew just this parallel. 
This interaction was quite telling about the American politics of the memory of 1956. 
 
Q: Thank you, Mr. President. Welcome to Cleveland. It's an honor to have you here. I represent 
the Cleveland Hungarian Revolution 50th Anniversary –  
 
THE PRESIDENT: That's good. I was there, by the way.  
 
Q: Thank you. (Laughter.)  
 
THE PRESIDENT: At least for the celebration in Capitol - with Tom Lantos. But go ahead.  
 
Q: Mr. President, in the interest of free speech if you'll indulge me, I have to give a little context 
of my question. On this third anniversary of your - I consider - courageous initiative to bring 
freedom and basic human dignity to the Iraqi people, the image of the statue of the tyrant 
Saddam falling in Baghdad was very reminiscent of another statue, another tyrant, Josef Stalin, 
who fell in Budapest 50 years ago at the hands of many young Hungarian freedom fighters who 
were seeking to overthrow the tyranny of Soviet communism. Mr. President, just like our brave 
fighting men and women today, and many Iraqi people, those young Hungarian patriots paid a 
very heavy price for a few days of freedom. But they lit the torch that eventually set the captive 
nations on the path to achieving liberty. And so, Mr. President, our Cleveland Hungarian 
community is planning a major event in Cleveland in October -- (laughter) –  
 
THE PRESIDENT: The guy sees the moment, you know - (laughter and applause.)  
 
Q: Right.  
 
THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure what I'm doing in October. Put me down as a maybe. (Laughter 
and applause.) Sorry to interrupt.  
 
Q: Just like you came for the children's game in 2004, we hope to have you here for that, as 
well. Mr. President, just want to let you know, to win the war on terror we feel that what was 
started in 1776, and continued in 1956, must be remembered in 2006.  
 
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. (Applause.)  
 
Q: I'm at the question now. Thanks for your indulgence.  
 
THE PRESIDENT: Okay, good. (Laughter.)  
 
Q: My basic question is, how can we help you, from the grassroots level, how can we help you 
promote the cause of freedom and liberty for all peoples throughout the world? ”49 
 
Because in his subsequent response Bush did not use the same analogy, it is unlikely 
that the question was planted by White House staff. Rather, the questioner buttonholed the 
president and made kin between Hungarians and Americans in their global quest for freedom 
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across several ideological systems and centuries – in order to lobby for a presidential visit to 
the Cleveland Hungarians’ 50th anniversary celebrations. Bush’s responses revealed a comfort 
level and familiarity with some of the most influential members of the Hungarian American 
community, as well as their agendas at the time. His reference to the March 2006 event in the 
U.S. Capitol featuring Congressman Lantos highlights the alignment of the US government and 
the Hungarian American community regarding the politics of the uprising’s memory. This event 
commemorated the March 15, 1848 Hungarian Revolution against Austria, but it also provided 
a forum for the diaspora and the Hungarian Embassy to lobby Bush and his staff for the highest 
level of U.S. representation at the official 1956 commemorations later that year. 
Whether the analogy came from the Bush administration, earlier U.S. presidents,50 the 
Hungarian American community or the Hungarian Embassy in D.C., the trope of 1956 as a 
predecessor of the coming of liberty in Iraq became the dominant message of the U.S. 
government’s contributions to the memorial programming of 2006. The most high-profile event 
of that year by the United States government was a presidential visit to Hungary in June – the 
first time since 1989 that a US head of state visited this tiny Central European country. Even 
though the visit was primarily for building bilateral relations and the commemoration of the 
anniversary, the fact that President Bush went to Hungary just days after the U.S.-EU summit 
in Vienna51 makes it clear that his sojourn had diplomatic value in the larger context of 
transatlantic relations. In other words, this trip could be understood as an attempt to cultivate 
the American alliance with one of the countries of “New Europe” in the Global War on Terror 
and beyond – and to likely strengthen the U.S. position in negotiations with (other countries of) 
the European Union.  
After meeting with the country’s top leaders and laying a wreath at the eternal flame,52 
in his remarks in Budapest President Bush elucidated the parallel between the two events, and 
the message of 1956 for 2006. Here Bush used the very place where he was speaking as a 
vantage point in time as well as in space.  
 
I appreciate the opportunity to stand here on Gellert Hill, which offers a striking view of your 
beautiful city. Fifty years ago, you could watch history being written from this hill. In 1956, the 
Hungarian people suffered under a Communist dictatorship and domination by a foreign power. 
That fall, the Hungarian people decided they had enough and demanded change. From this spot, 
you could see tens of thousands of students and workers and other Hungarians marching through 
the streets. They called for an end to dictatorship, to censorship, and to the secret police. They 
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called for free elections, a free press, and the release of political prisoners. These Hungarian 
patriots tore down the statue of Josef Stalin and defied an empire to proclaim their liberty.53  
 
Glossing over the civil war aspect and complex dynamic of the events of 1956, 
sidestepping questions about the responsibility of the U.S. government, Bush painted the usual 
broad-brush picture of the Hungarian people’s struggle for freedom versus Soviet Communist 
rule enforced by Russian troops. That empire crushed the Hungarian rising, but the Magyars’ 
yearning for liberty lived on in the thousands of exiles taken in by the United States, and in the 
inspiration their example provided for other freedom struggles.  
Yet the greatest inspiration of 1956 was its lesson to national governments.  
 
America honors your courage. We've learned from your example, and we resolve that when 
people stand up for their freedom, America will stand with them. […] You believe that free 
nations have an obligation to help others realize the benefits of freedom.54 
 
After spearheading the largely peaceful transition to democracy of the Eastern Bloc in 
1989, Hungary kept working for its ideal of liberty, now as part of an international coalition. 
After being peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
 
Hungarian troops are also defending freedom's cause in the war on terror. In Afghanistan, your 
soldiers have rebuilt schools and a medical center. They've helped train Afghan police to enforce 
the rule of law and to protect the Afghan people. In Iraq, Hungarian troops played a vital role in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom by providing security and delivering food and medical supplies to 
coalition forces. Today, Hungarian soldiers are helping to train Iraqi security forces. This is 
important work. By supporting these two young democracies, you are strengthening two new 
allies in the war on terror, and you're bringing hope to millions of people in a vital region of the 
world.55 
 
For Bush, Hungary’s current role in the two U.S.-led wars in the Middle East was a 
logical phase in the country’s history of fighting for liberty and against oppression. According 
to the U.S. president, this country of “New Europe” was now bearing the burden of Western 
democracies to spread the universalized ideal of liberty around the globe, liberating people from 
oppressive régimes.  
Next President Bush elaborated on the central message of this trip – and most likely, his 
whole European tour: shoring up the “Coalition of the Willing” in the Global War on Terror, in 
this case against the insurgency in Iraq.  
 
Last week, I traveled to Baghdad. I was impressed by what I saw. Americans and Hungarians 
and other coalition partners can be proud of what we have achieved in partnership with the Iraqi 
people. I met with Iraq's new Prime Minister and was able to see firsthand his strong character, 
his commitment to freedom, and his determination to succeed. Hungarians will recognize this 
spirit. Prime Minister Maliki is committed to the democratic ideals that also inspired Hungarian 
patriots in 1956 and 1989. He has a sound plan to improve security, to unify his people, and to 
deliver a better life for the citizens of Iraq. The success of the new Iraqi Government is vital to 
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the security of all nations, and so it deserves the support of the international community. We 
will continue to help the Iraqi Government establish free institutions, to achieve its goals, and 
we will continue to help Iraq take its rightful place alongside America and Hungary as beacons 
of liberty in our world.  
 
Iraq's young democracy still faces determined enemies, people who will use violence and 
brutality to stop the march of freedom. Defeating these enemies will require sacrifice and 
continued patience, the kind of patience the good people of Hungary displayed after 1956. We 
will help them rebuild a country destroyed by a tyrant. We'll help the Iraqis defeat the enemies 
of freedom. Our commitment is certain; our objective is clear. The new Iraqi Government will 
show the world the promise of a thriving democracy in the heart of the Middle East.56 
 
Here was Bush’s memory diplomacy tailored to the commemoration of 1956: for the 
American president, the impulse driving the rebuilding of Iraq and the coalition’s fight against 
the insurgency was the very same spirit that had animated the Hungarian revolution in 1956, 
and that country’s transition to democracy in 1989. His Hungarian American questioner in 
Cleveland had already articulated the full trajectory of this arc of liberty: the spirit of the 
American Revolution of 1776 informed the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and it permeated not 
only the latter’s 50th anniversary commemorations in both countries, but also the current Iraqi 
front of the Global War on Terror.57  
Finally, the foremost representative of the US government – and, as he especially 
emphasized here, of the American people – interpreted Hungary’s ‘spirit of ’56’ as one 
manifestation of the universal principle or force of liberty. 
 
The lesson of the Hungarian experience is clear: Liberty can be delayed, but it cannot be denied. 
The desire for liberty is universal, because it is written by our Creator into the hearts of every 
man, woman, and child on this Earth. And as people across the world step forward to claim their 
own freedom, they will take inspiration from your example and draw hope from your success.”58  
 
Hence, two nations where the universal force of liberty had already triumphed – in the 
United States in 1776, and in Hungary in 1989 after its tragic premature bloom in 1956 – were 
now in a coalition, a partnership bound together by that shared spirit, the two countries working 
to help the spirit of liberty triumph elsewhere in the world. 
 
The U.S. Embassy in Budapest: When to Use the Bunker? 
 
A careful observer could have arguably anticipated the explosion of the memory of 1956 
on October 23, 2006 from some events that had preceded it. On September 17, 2006 a post-
election speech by the Hungarian Socialist Party’s Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was 
leaked to the press. In the speech, Gyurcsány urged his parliamentary faction members to finally 
implement measures to restructure the country’s ailing economy. His tone rather resembled that 
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of a soccer coach – he used obscenities to punctuate his message and show his seriousness. The 
media de-contextualized Gyurcsány’s performance, displayed the crudest parts of the text and 
broadcast sound bites for days. While the Prime Minister’s immediate goal may have been to 
set a tone of familiarity and seriousness, as it was presented by the opposition and the 
audiovisual news media, his style violated the conventions and content of public political 
language. Even though Gyurcsány claimed the contrary, his references in the speech to not 
telling the truth to the electorate were widely interpreted by the political opposition as an 
admission that his government had lied about the state of the economy in order win re-election.  
     While the parties of the left expressed unconditional support for the Prime Minister, 
the major forces of the opposition called for his immediate resignation and the removal of his 
government. Crowds gathered on Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament and chanted “You 
Screwed Up” – a modified line from his speech. During the night of September 18, 2006, groups 
of protestors converged on the nearby headquarters of the state television in Republic Square, 
demanding to air their grievances on television. When they were turned down, hundreds of 
them stormed the television building and eventually captured it. (Itself an event reminiscent of 
1956.) Their battles with the police resulted in over 100 injuries, and some damage to the 
square’s memorial to the World War Two liberation of Hungary by the Soviet Red Army.59  
While police backup cleared the building by the next morning, and most parliamentary 
parties condemned the violence, a number of (mostly right-wing nationalist) protestor groups 
lodged themselves in the area in front of Parliament, and continued to demonstrate there for the 
next month. Partly using the situation to win the approaching municipal elections, the 
opposition’s major conservative party FIDESZ proceeded to hold demonstrations in the same 
place for two hours every afternoon to force the resignation of the government. Those who 
stayed on the spot all day round – most of them nationalists - soon came to be called “the 
Kossuth Square demonstrators.” These far-right nationalist groups all agreed that the prime 
minister and the current government should resign, but their objectives varied beyond that. They 
all seemed to demand that some kind of a constitutional assembly be convened and the 
“Communists” be purged from power – these measures were to guarantee genuine freedom and 
a real and complete change from totalitarianism to democracy.60 By being present with their 
bodies, signs and symbols, the protestors hoped to bring about change from the present to an 
older and partly imagined past. 
The United States government and American diplomats in Hungary could have arguably 
anticipated some of the events of October 23, 2006. International media had been covering the 
mounting tensions in Hungarian politics61 - to such an extent that the U.S. Embassy in Budapest 
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reported that its Hungarian contacts complained about misleading reports and damage to their 
country’s international reputation.62  
The seeming lack of U.S. precautionary measures is all the more surprising because the 
United States government itself was no stranger to conflict over memory, the most notorious 
cases of which included the Smithsonian museum’s 1992 The West as America exhibition, its 
1994 display of the Enola Gay’s fuselage to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the U.S. 
victory in the Pacific in World War Two, and National Endowment for the Humanities chair 
Lynne Cheney’s criticism of the national history curriculum.63 All these instances involved 
veterans and conservatives attacking a government-affiliated institution for its alleged lack of 
patriotism. Earlier, during the Cold War, the U.S. government itself had classified a number of 
domestic social movement and political organizations as potential terrorist groups for fear that 
they might disrupt its official commemorations of the Bicentennial of the Declaration of 
Independence, the nation’s official birthday.64 The government had also operated its own 
counter-radical programs, such as COINTELPRO, Operation Chaos and Operation Garden Plot 
in order to degrade any groups who may cause disorder or mount serious challenges to its 
power.65 The recent (2017) explosion of and struggle in American memory about the 
Confederate side in the US Civil War, with its champions of Southern ‘heritage’ and activists 
against the memorialization of racism is another example of the contested terrain and 
mobilizing force of U.S. public memory. 
What may have kept the U.S. government from acting on the threat of Hungarian 
domestic politics to the transatlantic commemorations of 1956 was an imperative not to 
interfere with its partners’ internal matters. If this was the case, there is clear evidence that the 
Americans were concerned that something may go wrong in Budapest on October 23, 2006. 
According to the Wikileaks “Cablegate” archive, between September 20 and November 9, 
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2006, the United States Embassy sent 20 cables from Budapest to the State Department in 
Washington, D.C., of which 18 discussed the country’s political tug-of-war. The U.S. Embassy 
was monitoring Hungary’s domestic pressure cooker in ways that may have gone beyond the 
usual diplomatic summaries of the host national media on relevant topics. The American 
diplomatic post sent its workers to the major political rallies and it even consulted a political 
analyst.66   
Both the Magyars and the U.S. Embassy also recognized the importance of the 
upcoming 1956 commemorations as a day of truth in Hungarian politics. Two days after the 
capture of the national television building by extremists, on September 20 Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány specifically addressed the foreign ambassadors in the country, professing 
confidence that his government would stabilize the situation before the 50th anniversary of 
1956. As the embassy’s report put it,  
 
Thoughtful but resolute, Gyurcsany was very much in command of the facts and of the situation. 
His comments to the diplomatic community reflect a leader who has considered the political, 
economic, and moral aspects of the issue ... and emerged convinced that his course of action is 
both right and worth defending.67 
 
The Hungarian prime minister was fully aware of how important it was to reassure the 
diplomatic community in the face of a possible threat to the high-level celebrations on October 
23.  
 
In conclusion, Gyurcsany appealed to the diplomatic community to "help my government and 
help me personally" by putting his comments in context. He also asked that embassies inform 
their governments that his government will do everything in its power to return to "normal life." 
They are exerting a "strong effort" to "control the situation" and will restore Hungary's 
"traditional face" before the 50th anniversary. He encouraged the diplomatic community to 
come to the government "anytime" with questions and concerns.68 
 
Meanwhile, the leaders of the major opposition forces likewise made an appeal to the 
foreign representatives in the country. On September 26, 2006, former foreign minister János 
Martonyi and MP Zsolt Németh argued to diplomats that while still legal, the Gyurcsány 
government had lost credibility and legitimacy with the people, and therefore it would soon 
“lose credit” in the international community. These politicians finessed their previous demands 
for the resignation of the Gyurcsány cabinet into a demand for a “one-year provisional 
government of experts.”  
U.S. Embassy personnel communicated to Washington the seriousness of Hungarian 
domestic politics. Uncle Sam’s diplomats clearly felt that the conflict between the governing 
Socialist-Liberal coalition, the opposition force FIDESZ and the far right over Prime Minister 
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Gyurcsány’s leaked speech was spinning out of control, and they blamed this on the choice by 
opposition leaders like Viktor Orbán to push for the resignation of the whole government 
through the use of popular rallies and civil disobedience. U.S. Ambassador April H. Foley’s 
analysis of the September 26 FIDESZ appeal to the ambassadors considered the opposition 
party to be lacking strategic vision in a position of tactical advantage, and deemed it to be 
controlled by party head Orbán’s heedless and reckless drive for power. 69  
At least one member of the FIDESZ delegation to the foreign ambassadors seized on 
memory as a tool to delegitimize the Gyurcsány government.  
 
Nemeth went further in his brief remarks, describing the PM as “a notorious pathological liar.” 
He cast the Gyurcsany government's policies as “living Kadarism” and stated, “this is about our 
past - about communism” and about the betrayal of “Hungary's judeo-christian values.” That is 
why the nation had “spontaneously” and “fantastically” risen up in response. Should Gyurcsany 
not pursue the government of experts, he concluded, there are “more negative scenarios” 
including a “declining moral and economic situation” and “growing social unrest and 
instability.”70 
 
Casting the conflict in moral terms, Németh claimed that Gyurcsány was the political 
descendant of János Kádár, the man whose defection provided legitimacy to the Soviet crushing 
of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, and who ruled the country as a dictator until 1988. Here 
Németh not only skilfully painted Gyurcsány as a “communist” – the same group who were the 
villains of 1956 – but he also recast the opposition’s recent riots and ongoing demonstrations 
as the same kind of “spontaneous” and “fantastic” reach for freedom by the people as 1956 in 
transatlantic cultural memory. Likewise, he implied that just like in 1956, events may yet spin 
out of control, into even more serious and bloody conflict. In his party’s effort at transatlantic 
diplomacy in a crisis, Németh was using the dominant memory régime of 1956 to recast the 
current struggle in Hungary in the appealing terms of the past. 
More than two weeks before the commemorative riots of October 23, 2006, the U.S. 
embassy in Budapest received an even more explicit warning – this time from their local 
political consultant. 
 
As Szabados also noted, the shadow of 1956 looms large over the current debate. FIDESZ 
members talk sincerely of the current showdown as a chance to “finally win the revolution” and 
often describe their opposition as a struggle against “communism.” Although the government's 
convergence plan represents an effort to address Hungary's future priorities, FIDESZ continues 
to look resolutely backward, blind to its own disturbing turn toward what Orban has termed 
“popular democracy.” As the 50th anniversary approaches, Szabados agrees that the confidence 
vote is “not the end but the beginning” (reftel). Whatever the results of the vote in Parliament, 
he believes FIDESZ will step up its actions to challenge - or openly obstruct - the government 
in the streets.71 
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This was a rather clear prediction that the major opposition party would be engaging in 
counter-commemorations on the 50th anniversary of 1956, attempting to thereby force the 
government to resign under pressure of a popular(ized) protest – or to damage its own 
credibility by aggressively responding to extra-legal street action.  
The above warning should have given the U.S. Embassy cause for making arrangements 
for an emergency. They may not have done so also because on October 11 the opposition 
FIDESZ party’s leader, Viktor Orbán made a ‘head fake’ in his own appeal to foreign 
ambassadors:  
 
Responding to questions from the diplomatic community regarding the upcoming 50th 
anniversary celebrations, Orban categorically rejected the possibility of participation in 
government-sponsored events. “The government is a lie,” he commented, “and we will not 
participate in a lie” but rather organize events “100 times bigger.” He also questioned whether 
President Solyom would choose to participate in the events with PM Gyurcsany. (Note: We 
have received no indication that the President, an official host of the commemorative events, is 
considering any such step. End Note.)72 
 
Orbán’s promise not to interfere with the official celebrations and to keep the 
opposition’s alternative commemorations peaceful may have reassured the diplomatic 
community, including the American post. In hindsight, it is clear that he either had not intended 
to keep this promise or he should not have made it. It only likely complicated matters that one 
week later, in a separate meeting with G7 ambassadors, Orbán said that he and his party would 
still attend parts of the celebrations involving the president of the republic.73  
The American diplomatic post may not have made arrangements for an emergency also 
because they seem to have believed the Hungarian government’s promises. In his September 
20 meeting with the diplomatic community, PM Gyurcsány was optimistic about the prospects 
of a peaceful transatlantic commemoration of 1956 in a month’s time. 
 
He believes the situation will return to normal before the 50th anniversary celebrations, 
commenting that “not even I would accuse the opposition” of “soiling the memory of the 
revolution” with "violence in the streets.74 
 
Whether the U.S. Embassy relayed serious concerns about Hungary’s domestic politics 
or its own security – there is no evidence to support or refute this – the American government 
may have actually scaled back its level of representation at the anniversary. On September 25, 
the Office of the Press Secretary announced the roster of the delegation appointed by President 
Bush for a commemorative visit to Hungary. Besides U.S. Ambassador to Hungary April Foley, 
the only high-level delegate on the team was New York state Governor George Pataki. Like 
him, the two other delegation members were both Hungarian Americans: former professional 
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football player Peter Gogolak, and finance mogul Steven Udvar-Hazy.75 Thus, Bush sent to 
Hungary not cabinet-level representatives, but members of the U.S. Hungarian diaspora, people 
who could be regarded as the most unproblematic American representatives – or the best 
potential cultural mediators. 
The American delegation’s meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány 
was admittedly anti-climactic. The day before the official commemorations, Gyurcsány spent 
little time dwelling on the past: 
 
Gyurcsany opened the meeting by reflecting on the anniversary as both a historical event and 
as a “mirror in which we see ourselves today.” He referred frankly to the “tough political fight” 
with the opposition, but emphasized his desire to "make sure the picture includes all colors.76 
 
The prime minister’s eagerness to move on to discussing the present rather than the 
anniversary was surprising especially because of the “hearts string diplomacy” that the U,S, 
delegates played in the meeting. 
 
Governor Pataki recalled watching the events of 1956 as a young man and referred to the 
uprising as "the only time I ever saw my father cry." The experience remains with him to this 
day and inspires the entire world. Delegates Peter Gogolak and Steven Udvar-Hazy recalled 
their own paths from Hungary to the United States in the aftermath of the uprising, expressing 
their hope that the anniversary would help unite the nation behind the reforms necessary to 
ensure long-term prosperity.77 
 
While the three U.S. delegates all wanted to recall their personal (childhood) 
impressions of 1956 – their flashbulb memories - Gyurcsány, born 5 years after the event, relied 
on cultural memory to establish common ground. Whether because of the ethnic ties, the 
transatlantic links of memory, or the mutually recognized urgency of Hungarian domestic 
politics, the conversation soon turned to the present. Gyurcsány asked for advice on 
implementing reform, and the U.S. delegates urged him to be decisive and steadfast in his 
policies.78 The American participants of this meeting clearly used the encounter to derive from 
the memory of 1956 a message of resolution and unity for Hungary’s troubled today. 
 
Memory Unravels: The Budapest Riots of 2006 
 
In spite of an agreement between the protest camp and law enforcement to share 
Parliament square announced just three days earlier,79 in the early morning of October 23, 2006 
police decided to remove all demonstrators from the square. Authorities claimed that this 
measure was necessitated by the protestors’ refusal to be subjected to the security search that 
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they had previously agreed to. During the operation, police took photographs of the weapons 
found at the protestors’ campsite. 
The removal of the Kossuth Square group only served to galvanize their sympathizers. 
In the course of the morning, as the official ceremonies got under way, over a thousand people 
gathered in several groups in places off the square. Riot police corralled them away from the 
ceremonies as they chanted “Get lost, Gyurcsány,” “Traitor,” “’56, ‘56,” and “AVH” (referring 
to the Communist secret police). The prime minister obliquely responded to the protests in a 
parliamentary speech, emphasizing the difference between 1956 and 2006: back then people 
had no choice but to take to the streets, while now these groups were choosing to question the 
legitimacy of democracy as a system.80  
     Most media accounts agree that the removal of the protestors from Kossuth Square 
set the tone for the events of the day. Their own signs and repeated references to this confirm 
that displacement from the square inflamed their feelings and triggered further protests. When 
dignitaries laid wreathes at another site, protestors in an adjoining street shouted, “We want to 
celebrate! Gyurcsány, get out!”81 Shortly after noon, a cell phone text message urged protesters 
around the city to “join the Kossuth Square group who were chased away by the liar Gyurcsány 
and his business partners. Now is the time to act together while the international press is here. 
Long live ‘56, pass it on.”82 
     The displaced and other groups did hold their own commemorations – and the place 
they chose for it was another major site of 1956 memory, Corvin Lane. Once a spot of bitter 
fighting between young revolutionaries and Soviet tanks, the lane was now home to a movie 
theater of the same name, and it acquired a memorial statue to “the lads of Pest” back in the late 
1990s. For the 50th anniversary of the 1956 events, a public history exhibition was installed in 
the lane, complete with period trucks, tanks and an artillery piece.83 Families were enjoying the 
interactive display, and 1956 veterans were wrapping up their own commemoration when the 
now several thousand strong Kossuth Square crowd converged on Corvin Lane. Soon more 
veterans arrived in period open-plateau Csepel trucks, which bore 1956 slogans.84 
     In Corvin Lane, the Kossuth Square groups took over the stage and sound apparatus 
of the previous event, and they listened to a number of speakers there. People such as the leader 
of the Goy Bikers Association urged the crowd to retake Kossuth Square. However, the media 
had reported that the police chief had declared the square “an area of [police] operation,” 
indefinitely off limits to civilian traffic.85 After about 2 hours, the crowd headed out of Corvin 
Lane.  
     At this point, the Kossuth Square demonstrators broke into several groups as the 
police tried to control them peacefully. As it is so often the case, it is not clear why clashes 
began around 3:30 PM in Alkotmány Street. The interaction between these crowds and the 
police soon escalated into violence. Demonstrators built barricades and threw stones at the 
police, who responded with teargas.86  
     Several episodes prove that people in the crowd consciously chose to ‘re-enact’ 
episodes of 1956 in order to bring about change in the present. While articles and videos on 
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major online news portals showed that they consistently linked their causes to the 
commemorations, and used the rhetoric of the uprising 50 years before (“revolution,” “’56,” 
“AVH”),87 some protestors also tried to approximate period dress, carried the commemorative 
national flag with a hole in the middle, and used their environment as props. In Corvin Lane, 
they enthusiastically greeted the veterans of ’56 and climbed onto their period trucks.88 Later, 
they tore down the giant letters “Capital of Freedom” displayed in front of City Hall, and used 
the word “Freedom” as a moving barricade.  
     In an episode that made headlines in most national and some international news 
media, demonstrators forced open a period tank on the living history display, managed to start 
it, and drove it towards the police, stopping short of tragedy. In fact, by that time protesters had 
already used several period vehicles as barricades and transportation – like the Csepel trucks 
mentioned above. However, the use of the tank as a single event seems to have come to 
epitomize the clashing and blending of memory, protest and commemorations on October 23, 
2006.  
     For the purposes of this analysis, it matters little who started the tank and how. The 
tank episode highlights the crux of the 2006 October events - that even though former 1956 
fighters participated in both the official commemorations and the spontaneous protests, their 
presence was overshadowed by what other people did. What made the protestors authentic in 
their own eyes was not some objective reality or historical fact, but their performance. This 
performance - their repertoire - was to some extent based on previous representations of the 
1956 events – by their cultural memory’s archive of photographs, texts, and personal accounts, 
as presented by various printed and audiovisual media – as well as the opinion of their peers.  
The tank did stop before it reached the police. The question of why it did so is important, 
because it may prove that protestors did not get lost in their re-enactment – that they possessed 
the double consciousness Jenny Thompson describes: an awareness that they were reliving not 
the actual events, only their representations.89 While the museum director claimed that the tank 
stopped because it ran out of fuel (it had just enough to move up and down its carrier vehicle), 
the participant witnesses said that they stopped it because they deemed the ride too dangerous.90 
This would also mean that they wanted to keep their re-enactment protest in certain limits. For 
this and other reasons, although over 100 people were injured during the night of riots, no one 
died.  
   The rest of October 23, 2006 featured further barricade building, stone-throwing, tear 
gas attacks, water cannons, rubber bullets, police cavalry charges, the detainment of 131 and 
the injuries of over a 100 people, before the last group of protestors was finally dispersed around 
1:30 AM the next day. 
     While various groups of protesters asserted their understanding of the message of 
1956 to 2006 on the streets of Budapest, Hungarian and international politicians and historians 
performed their own interpretations of the past in efforts to fix the meaning of the historical 
conflict – mostly their own meaning. As their street fighter counterparts, they were waging the 
battles of the present through the past. Most of them lamented that the people of today “not only 
celebrate separately – they celebrate different things,”91 and that they were “selective” and 
creative in their interpretations and commemoration of the past. Many wished to restore a unity 
of meaning that is elusive even for some professional historians.  Although Prime Minister 
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Gyurcsány pointed out that “every age uses every historical event to legitimize itself,”92 not 
even he offered any self-critique.  
Elsewhere I developed the concept of counter-commemorations - events in which a 
current social group claim the mantle of one of the participants of the original historical event, 
and attempt to ‘complete’ what they regard as the original project of the past in the present.93 
The October 23, 2006 riots in Budapest were this and more: the city was a pressure cooker for 
the multi-player game of the politics of the cultural memory of the 1956 Hungarian uprising, in 
which a number of groups were contesting the meaning of the original historical events with 
their commemorative performances. In this instance, the non-state actors of Hungarian right-
wing extremists, the democratic opposition FIDESZ party and their power base, with some help 
from the veterans of 1956, converged to challenge the official memory régime of the Hungarian 




The official commemorations and the whole day of October 23 were marred by riotous 
counter-commemorations of crowds composed of Hungarian extremists and FIDESZ 
supporters. The carefully crafted official transatlantic performances of memory were drowned 
out in the international media by reports of barricades, burning cars, a historical tank hijacked 
by demonstrators, and tear gas and riot police dispersing the crowds – vernacular alternative 
performances challenging the legitimacy of the official memory régime of 1956.94 
What ultimately saved the transatlantic memory diplomacy of 1956 in 2006 was not that 
either government, their foreign policy corps or diplomatic posts would have anticipated the 
commemorative riots that erupted from the pressurized domestic politics of Hungary. 
Commemorative diplomacy on both sides sailed through the storm of Magyar memory politics 
most likely because by the time the unrest happened on October 23, both governments had 
largely completed their commemorative events. As Zoltán Fehér recalled,  
 
It is important that what we did in Washington had a very good response, and this – not in the 
least – offset the disturbances that took place back home. This is mostly due to the fact that we 
                                                 
92 “Gyurcsany Flattered Boross.” October 30, 2006. Index.hu. In Hungaian. Online: 
http://index.hu/politika/belfold/elkurtuk2/. 
93 For more on counter-commemorations as commemorative performances of current political claims, 
see Gyorgy Toth, “Performing ‘the Spirit of ’76’: U.S. Historical Memory and Counter-Commemorations for 
American Indian Sovereignty.” In Amanda Gilroy and Marietta Messmer, eds., America: Justice, Conflict, War. 
The European Views of the United States book series of the European Association for American Studies. 
Heidelberg, Germany: Winter University Press, 2016, 131-150.  
94 For an assortment of news items of the October 23, 2006 commemorative riots in Budapest, see 
“Hungarian Police Clamp Down on Anti-Government Protests.” The Guardian, October 23, 2006. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/23/1; Pablo Gorondi, “Violence Mars Anniversary of '56 Revolt 
in Hungary.” The Washington Post, Oct 24, 2006, p. A.16. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/23/AR2006102301478.html; Craig S. Smith, “Clashes Disrupt Hungarians’ 
Celebration of Anti-Soviet Revolt in ’56.” The New York Times, October 24, 2006, p A11. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/world/europe/24hungary.html; “Hungary Divided.” The Economist, 
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“Deja Vu as Tank Blunders into Uprising's 50th Anniversary.” Sidney Morning Herald (via The Telegraph, 
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2006. ABC News (Australia). http://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-10-24/hungarian-protesters-hijack-soviet-era-




began planning the events already in February. Then we put together the [US] presidential visit 
in June…  
 
In other words, by the autumn we had created a kind of enthusiasm about the commemorative 
events, which continued in early September, and throughout October, they even screened 
Children of Glory in the White House on October 28… In sum, to some extent the sights and 
sounds of our fireworks drowned out the thunder and lightning back home [in Hungary].95 
 
From the vantage point of rarefied elite diplomacy, the 2006 commemorations of 1956 
achieved their goals of cultivating the transatlantic relations between Hungary and the United 
States. Yet what the wider audiences saw of the anniversary was a train wreck. As so often, the 
truth was somewhere between the two. The case of the 50th anniversary commemorations of the 
1956 Hungarian uprising demonstrates that even the most carefully crafted official 
remembrance of the past is vulnerable to challenges to its memory régime by non-state actors. 
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